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Abstract— We consider a quantity-setting duopoly
model, and we study the decision to move first or
second, by assuming that the firms produce homo-
geneous goods and that there is some demand uncer-
tainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods,
and in either period, the firms can make a production
decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are
allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they
make the decision, we study the circumstances that
favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.
Keywords: Industrial Organization, Game Theory,
Cournot model, uncertainty
1 Introduction
In a standard duopoly, firms choose either prices or quan-
tities in a non-cooperative fashion. If the decisions are
made simultaneously, these models are called, respec-
tively, Bertrand model and Cournot model (see [2, 3]).
Sometimes, one of the firm has the opportunity to make
his decision before the other firm. In a quantity set-
ting, the situation is called Stackelberg model (see [17]).
Stackelberg leader-follower relations have most often been
modeled in association with the chronological order of
moves. Namely, there are a first mover (leader) and a
second mover (follower). In spite of such a supposedly
dynamic setting, it has been common to overlook what
happens during the period between these two moves, by
assuming a static market which clears only once, after the
second mover’s move. This builds certain biases into the
analysis of firms’ strategic incentives either to lead or to
follow, which are the contributing forces to endogenous
Stackelberg outcomes.
In the earlier literature, endogenous leader/follower has
been imbedded most often in the context of a timing
game played by oligopolists. Hamilton and Slutsky [7]
construct an ‘extended game’ framework, in which each
firm faces the choice of production timing. A fair number
of theoretical explanations have been attempted with re-
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gard to firms’ incentives for Stackelberg behaviour, espe-
cially a follower’s incentive to wait. Robson [14] imposes
costs associated with an early action. Albaek [1] takes
into account cost uncertainty. The effect of a priori in-
formational heterogeneity between firms, broadly defined,
have been discussed in several studies, including Mailath
[12] and Normann [13]. On the other hand, when the
oligopolists are a priori equally uncertain about the mar-
ket demand, as in Maggi [11], Sadanand and Sadanand
[15] and Spencer and Brander [16], earlier production
can utilize less information in exchange for the strate-
gic advantage of commitment, whereas later production
does the converse. Hirokawa and Sasaki [8] employed a
similar framework to Hamilton and Slutsky’s ‘extended
game’, except that the static market is replaced with an
explicitly two-period market. Lagerlo¨f [10] shows that if
the distribution of the demand uncertainty has a mono-
tone hazard rate and if another, rather weak, assumption
is satisfied, then uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed.
Ferreira et al. [4] study the effects of demand uncertainty
in a Stackelberg duopoly.
In this paper, we follow closely the paper of Kultti and
Niinima¨ki [9], by considering a more general demand
function. We assume that the competitive phase consists
of two periods. In either period, the firms can make a pro-
duction decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms
are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they
make the decision, one can study the circumstances that
favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions. If
this is the only change in the standard setting with perfect
information there are now three pure strategy subgame
perfect equilibria when the firms are symmetric (see [7]).
Either of the firm is a leader and the other one a fol-
lower, or both of them make the same choices as in the
standard setting in the first period. The firms prefer the
equilibrium in which they move first. Even though no
equilibrium selection is helpful here the symmetry of the
situation makes the symmetric equilibrium appealing.
In our work the production period plays a non-trivial
role since we assume that the demand is uncertain, and
that the uncertainty is resolved once either firm makes
its production decision. The enterprise bears a close re-
lationship to the literature about endogenous timing of
moves in oligopolies (see [1, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13]). Hamilton and
Slutsky [7] study two different games: A game in which
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firms announce in which period they are going to produce,
and are committed to this announcement, and a game in
which the firms can choose in which period to produce
only by actually producing. Our model corresponds to
the second game, the difference being uncertainty about
demand and differentiated goods. In our model, simulta-
neous moves is never an equilibrium, and depending on
the variance of the demand, either the first mover or the
second mover may be more profitable.
The crucial assumption in our model is the way demand
is revealed. If either firm produces in the first period, de-
mand is known in the second period. In case neither firm
produces in the first period, demand remains unknown
in the second period. This is clearly a very specific as-
sumption that applies only to some markets. Perhaps,
the most important is the case of new products. Demand
for new products is highly uncertain, and many times the
only way to find it is to enter the markets by producing
the product. By the assumption made, the demand is
revealed since some products are sold in the first period,
and then we can ask why the firm cannot produce more
in the second period if demand turns out to be strong.
The answer is the same as in the standard Stackelberg
model: it is assumed that the firms are committed to the
levels of production which they choose. The standard
static case is an approximation of a dynamic real life sit-
uation that is compressed into two stages. Our model
can be regarded as an approximation of a real life situ-
ation in which a producer brings a new product to the
market. First, he has to expend his time in production,
and only after this he sells the product which is time
consuming as well. The competitor produces while the
first producer sells his products. This model allows us to
analyse the trade-off between producing early, and being
well informed about demand.
2 The model
There are two firms and two time periods. Both firms
produce a differentiated good. The demand, for simplic-
ity, is linear, namely
p = α− β(q1 + q2),
with α > 0 and β ≥ 1, where p is the price and qi the
amount produced of good i, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Firms have the
same constant marginal cost c. We consider that the de-
mand intercept is a random variable which is assumed to
have a continuous density. The density of α is, however,
common knowledge. The expected value of α is E(α).
We assume that the variance V (α) of α is not too large
in a sense that in no case the firms produce so much that
price drops to zero.
Our aim is to study the effect of information revelation
on the timing of the firms’ production decisions. To this
end we model the firms playing the following extensive
game. The firms make their decisions non-cooperatively,
and they may choose the quantity to be produced in ei-
ther period. If a firm produces already in period 1 the
choice is common knowledge in period 2, and the true
demand is revealed. If neither firm produces in the first
period no information about demand is revealed in the
second period. Notice that the game is not a signalling
game, and that unlike in many models only actions speak;
firms commit to a production decision by producing, not
making announcements about when they intend to pro-
duce and how much (see [1, 7]). Next we determine the
profits when the firms move sequentially and simultane-
ously, and then we compare the profits in the two cases.
2.1 Sequential decisions
Without loss of generality, let firm 1 be the first mover
and make its decision in the first period. Firm 2 is the
follower which delays its production decisions until the
second period. Firm 1 believes (correctly) that its pro-
duction decision in period 1 will influence firm 2’s deci-
sion a period later. That is, the follower will select q2 to
maximize its profit
π2 = (α− βq1 − βq2(α)− c)q2(α).
Thus,
q2(α) =
α− βq1 − c
2β
. (1)
First mover’s decision problem is to maximize his ex-
pected profit
E(π1) = E((α− βq1 − βq2 − c)q1)
=
E(α)− βq1 − c
2
q1.
Thus,
q1 =
E(α)− c
2β
. (2)
Using equation (2), the follower’s choice (1) can be rewrit-
ten
q2(α) =
2α− E(α)− c
4β
,
and the equilibrium price turns out
p(α) =
2α− E(α) + 3c
4
.
First mover’s expected profit is
E(π1) =
(E(α)− c)2
8β
, (3)
while the follower’s expected profit is
E(π2) =
(E(α)− c)2
16β
+
V (α)
4
. (4)
First mover has an advantage, if
(E(α)− c)2
8β
>
(E(α)− c)2
16β
+
V (α)
4
,
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which is equivalent to
(E(α)− c)2 > 4V (α). (5)
If the variance in α is small, the usual Stackelberg case
where the first mover has always an advantage prevails.
Only if the variance is large, the first mover may fare
worse than the second mover. Note that the first mover’s
profit does not depend upon the variance. This comes
from the linear demand and the fact that the variance is
assumed small enough so that realized prices are always
positive. The second mover’s profit depends upon the
variance since variance indicates the pay-off from waiting
as the second mover knows the realized demand.
So, we have proved the following result.
Theorem 1. The second mover earns higher profits than
the first mover, if the variance is large enough (i.e., if
V (α) > (E(α)− c)2/4). Otherwise, the first mover earns
higher profits.
2.2 Simultaneous decisions
As long as both firms make their production decisions
simultaneously the profits are the same regardless of the
period, since the assumptions about the revelation of in-
formation guarantee that the demand is unknown. Firm
1 maximizes its expected profit
E(π1) = E((α− β(q1 + q2)− c)q1).
Thus,
q1 =
E(α)− βq2 − c
2β
.
Similarly, we get
q2 =
E(α)− βq1 − c
2β
.
Thus, in equilibrium, output decisions are given by
q1 = q2 =
E(α)− c
3β
,
and the price given by
p(α) =
3α− 2E(α) + 2c
3
.
So, the expected profits of both firms are equal, given by
E(π1) = E(π2) =
(E(α)− c)2
9β
. (6)
It is easy to establish that, in equilibrium, both firms do
not produce in the first period; a revealed preference ar-
gument is sufficient to establish this. Assume that there
is an equilibrium in which both firms produce in the first
period. Denote the firms’ equilibrium outputs by q∗1 and
q∗2 . Consider, say, firm 1. Suppose that it deviates and
waits until the next period when it gets to know the real-
ized demand. It can still produce q∗1 , but with full knowl-
edge of the demand this output level is not the optimal
choice. Firm 2 produces (E(α)−c)/(3β) and the upcom-
ing production of deviating firm 1 will be
3α− E(α)− 2c
6β
.
Thus, the expected profit is
(E(α)− c)2
9β
+
V (α)
4β
,
which is V (α)/(4β) higher than if the firm would not
deviate. This shows that there is no equilibrium with
both firms producing in the first period. Thus, there
are three possible equilibria: (i) Firm 1 produces in the
first period and firm 2 in the second period; (ii) Firm 2
produces in the first period and firm 1 in the second; and
(iii) both firms produce in the second period.
Next, we compare the profits in the sequential and si-
multaneous moves cases to determine whether or when
sequential moves are more profitable than simultaneous
moves. Whenever the first mover’s expected profit is
larger than his expected profit in the simultaneous move
case, simultaneous moves is not an equilibrium. But,
from equations (3) and (6), we see that this is always the
case. We must still show that firm 2 does not deviate
and produce in the first period, when firm 1 is already
producing
E(α)− c
2β
in the first period. Firm 2’s optimal output choice in the
first period is
E(α)− c
4β
.
Thus, firm 2’s expected profit is
(E(α)− c)2
16β
,
V (α)/(4β) less than if the firm waited to the next period.
Thus, firm 2 does not deviate and there does not exist an
equilibrium in which the firms move simultaneously.
Now, we are going to compare the expected profits of
the two moving alternatives. Firm F2 prefers sequential
solution to simultaneous moves, if (4) is larger than (6),
which is equivalent to
36V (α) > 7(E(α)− c)2. (7)
Combining conditions (5) and (7), we get that
7(E(α)− c)2/9 < 4V (α) < (E(α)− c)2, (8)
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and we can say that if condition (8) holds the first mover
earns more than the follower and both firms prefer se-
quential moves to simultaneous moves.
So, we have proved the following result.
Theorem 2. The game presented in this paper has ex-
actly two equilibria in both of which the firms move se-
quentially.
This result implies that, in cases where demand uncer-
tainty is revealed only after at least one firm produces,
there are no simultaneous equilibria. The case in which
both firms move simultaneously in the first period is not
an equilibrium, since either firm can wait till the next pe-
riod when it has the same choice set as in the first period,
and additionally it knows the realized demand. The case
in which both firms move simultaneously in the second
period is not an equilibrium roughly because a deviating
firm gains a first mover advantage. Generally, this is an
advantage only with respect to the simultaneous moves
case since it is possible that the second mover’s profits
are greater than the first mover’s profits.
3 Conclusions
We have shown that in cases where demand uncertainty
is revealed only after at least one firm produces, there are
no simultaneous equilibria in a quantity-setting duopoly.
We also proved that the second mover earns higher profits
than the first mover, if the uncertainty is high; Otherwise,
the first mover earns higher profits.
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